Reparation and restitution for Mozambique: signs of the future Eduardo Quive ^{n. 09} The next shot of restitution: scenes from Mozambique ^{Janvier 2026}

In May 2019, the Oficina de História de Moçambique held the first seminar "Restitution of Cultural Heritage to Mozambique: History, Reality and Utopia" and in June 2021, it held the second edition, with the theme "Restitution and Reparation in Post-conflict Identity"¹. In fact, these events brought to Mozambique reflections that were already amply debated in several African countries. The present text discusses the stakes of the debates in the context of the broader political and social situation in the country.

Mozambique marks the 50th anniversary of its independence, achieved in 1975, while Portugal recently commemorated the 50th anniversary of the end of its dictatorship in 1974. This chronological overlap is not accidental.

The two anniversaries highlight distinct but intertwined historical moments. For Mozambique, the current commemorations coincide with a renewed phase of socio-political transformation, visible since the 2023 municipal elections, when opposition parties began to contest the Frelimo² party’s long-standing hold on power through new strategies of claiming victory.

Mozambique’s post-2023 election protests marked an unprecedented moment in the nation's recent history, as urban youth assumed a leading role in reshaping the country’s political landscape. The country witnessed its first popular protests against electoral fraud, with demonstrators refusing to recognize the results that gave Frelimo victory in 56 of the country's 65 municipalities. Public anger has grown out of persistent unemployment, exclusion from public services, and widespread corruption—factors that especially affect the younger population. The protests were called by politician Venâncio Mondlane, at the time a member of the Assembly of the Republic and the Renamo party³’s candidate for Mayor of Maputo.

The wave of protests paralysed Maputo and confirmed the popularity of Mondlane, who subsequently positioned himself as a candidate for the Presidency in the 2024 elections.

In October 2024, Mozambique held its seventh Presidential and Legislative Elections, along with the fourth Provincial Assembly and Governor Elections. The duel between Venâncio Mondlane and the Frelimo candidate, Daniel Francisco Chapo, was confirmed, with Chapo being proclaimed the winner and inaugurated as the fifth President of Mozambique. Disagreement with the official election results and evidence of electoral fraud once again triggered widespread protests across the country, mirroring those first seen in 2023. People from both urban and suburban areas took to the streets. This time, the mobilizations represent not only a reaction to flawed electoral outcomes, but also signal a deeper generational shift. A new civic consciousness is emerging that rejects historical party narratives and deploys social media and digital networks for collective action.

Never before had Mozambique witnessed protests of such magnitude; recent events have marked a turning point in the country's political culture. In vibrant urban centers all over the country, thousands of young people took to the streets, determined to challenge entrenched power structures and advocate for broad reforms.

The emergence of this new political dynamic stems from several converging factors: growing access to information, persistent failings of the welfare state and the diminishing resonance of Frelimo’s legacy as a liberation movement. For a generation born after independence or during the multi-party era, references to Frelimo’s historic role against colonialism have lost their meaning and do not offer relevant solutions for the realities they face today.

Democracy in Mozambique was established after the civil war ended with the signing of the General Peace Accords in Rome in 1992. These accords, signed by President Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama, ended the 16-year conflict and paved the way for general elections by universal suffrage. However, whenever democratic processes proved ineffective or unreliable, the threat of a return to war loomed. This occurred in 2013, resulting in yet another agreement between Armando Guebuza, then President of the Republic (2005-2015), and Afonso Dhlakama, President of RENAMO (1979-2018), but it was short-lived. The most recent pact between the government and RENAMO was signed in 2019: the Agreement for the Definitive Cessation of Military Hostilities.⁴

Given the historical context—including demonstrations for electoral justice following the municipal elections of October 2023 and the general elections of October 2024, which escalated into widespread social unrest—it is remarkable that, for the first time, political disputes and allegations of fraud did not escalate into armed confrontation.

In this social and political context, the reflection on restitution and reparation for the damage caused by colonialism is only starting to emerge, quietly, among silent voices. A country that, since achieving independence, is still going through the process of decolonisation⁵ and continues searching for a path to genuine state sovereignty. As Mozambican researcher Maria Paula Meneses observes:

Thinking about Mozambique today, it is impossible to recover, (re)think, and (re)make in fifty years what took centuries of denial of our very humanity. A sovereign nation since 1975, Mozambique carries within itself the ignominy of colonization, which it has continuously sought to overcome.⁶

50 years since 25 April: echoes of the past in the present

When the 50th anniversary of the Revolution of 25 April 1974 was being celebrated, the official ceremonies which took place in Lisbon with the heads of state and government of Portuguese-speaking countries in attendance, the words of the President of the Republic of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, on the colonial process were echoed in the Portuguese press: “We have to pay the costs. Are there actions that have not been punished and those responsible have not been arrested? Are there assets that have been looted and not returned? Let's see how we can make amends (...). It's not just about apologising-which is undoubtedly due-for what we’ve done, because apologising is sometimes the easiest thing to do: you apologise, turn your back, and you’ve done your job. No, it’s taking responsibility for the future for the good and bad things we've done in the past.”⁷

The words of the President of the Republic of Portugal come after Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa, during a visit to Maputo in 2022⁸, acknowledged responsibility for the Wiriyamu massacre⁹, which took place on 16 December 1972—fifty years before. António Costa called the event an "inexcusable act that dishonours" Portugal's history. Other massacres committed during the Portuguese colonial regime, such as the Mueda, Inhaminga, Mucumbura, Chawola, and Jamu massacres, were not mentioned.

Marcelo Ribeiro de Sousa's statements were not addressed directly to the countries or heads of state present at the 25 April ceremonies. In Mozambique, the government's reaction was eagerly awaited, but it never came. What we did see was a statement by the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, who was in Portugal at the time, which was limited to looking at the contradictory narratives between countries about the April Revolution:

"Portugal recognises mistakes made against the people who fought for freedom, mistakes that are inexcusable, dishonour our history and deserve the condemnation of anyone who respects life and human dignity (...). We need to teach the truth in our schools, in Portugal and in Portuguese-speaking countries: the 25 April Revolution was built in Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (...)"¹⁰

Another statement that came in response to questions from the press was from Mozambique's Ambassador to the United Nations, Pedro Comissário, who said: "Saying that the past was wrong is already a measure of reparation. But if we can go beyond that, yes, it would be even better."¹¹

The writer Mia Couto, during the same period, said in an interview¹²: "I don't like the term reparation. I prefer understanding the term more in the sense of building something that takes into account that there was a history. (...) What we want from history is precisely that historical truth is not erased, but that it is not the basis for any feeling of guilt. Today's generations should not be blamed for things that were done in a completely different historical context."

Narratives of national pride

Mozambique has not yet taken a formal position on matters of reparation or restitution vis-à-vis Portugal for its colonial past. However, after national independence, the country took a decision that moved in the direction of historical reparation. On 15 June 1985, Mozambique celebrated the solemn "return" of Ngungunhana¹³, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Mozambique's independence. Ngungunhana, the last emperor of Gaza, had already been awarded the title of National Hero by the government for his resistance to Portuguese colonialism. The act represented another stage in the construction of the nationalist narrative and the symbolism of victory over the colonialist regime.

“It is an occasion when we restore to the past its true greatness in order to reaffirm its enduring qualities in our culture, our personality, our national identity," as Samora Machel put it.¹⁴ .

However, it later transpired that what had been brought to Mozambique was not the remains¹⁵ of the National Hero, but sand from his burial site in the Azores placed in a coffin. The restitution was therefore only a symbolic, since the actual remains were irretrievable. Subsequently, the true location of his burial on 24 December 1906 was discovered in the Conceição cemetery in Angra do Heroísmo.

In 2007, the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Plant (HCB) was transferred from Portugal to Mozambique, in an agreement¹⁶ classified by the then Prime Minister of Portugal, José Sócrates, as historic, achieved in "negotiations that had been dragging on since 1975"¹⁷. It was an event of economic significance, but one that was perceived as symbolic of "national pride" and proclaimed in official communications to the nation—broadcast live on national television by the President of the Republic, Armando Emílio Guebuza¹⁸—as a "second independence."

However, the 'transfer' operation represented a cash inflow of 950 million dollars for Portugal¹⁹, justified as compensation for the construction and maintenance of the dam, and it still holds 15 per cent of HCB's shares.

The future of the debate

The discourse of restitution and reparation has so far been initiated and sustained by the former coloniser, rather than as a response to a wish expressed by formerly colonized communities. In this regard, among Portugal's former colonies, Brazil is the country that has taken a firm stance, with the government proposing concrete actions for reparations²⁰. These proposals by Brazil also extend to African countries that were formerly colonised by Portugal.

Civil society organisations in Brazil have proposed actions such as: "Signing effective collaboration pacts and agreements with Brazil–as well as with other countries that were colonised by Portugal–with the aim of promoting reparations through financial investments, safeguarding memories and reviewing nationality and transit pacts and partnerships between the countries; Adopting effective measures to combat xenophobia and racism against the Afro-descendant population in Portugal."²¹

Can the transfer of Ngungunhana's remains and the reversion of the majority of HCB be seen as representative acts of restitution? In the case of Ngungunhana, the act was primarily symbolic, since the actual remains were irretrievable. In the case of Cahora Bassa, it was primarily a financial transaction that still resulted in Mozambican funds being transferred to Portugal. Nevertheless, both cases serve as reference points for critical reflection on postcolonial restitution.

We can turn to Babacar Mbaye Diop's assertion that "the problem of reparation must be resolved before there can be talk of restitution. Africa continues to be plundered and robbed of its natural and material resources by foreign powers. This makes the continent increasingly impoverished and pushes young Africans towards the Mediterranean Sea in the hope of a better tomorrow."²²

This excerpt underscores that gestures of symbolic restitution are inadequate as long as deep-rooted inequalities and the ongoing economic exploitation of Africa continue.

Mozambique does not face the same migration scenario as other African countries. However, social conditions remain a persistent challenge. In a country where the majority of approximately 30 million inhabitants are young, there are no clear policies to meet their demands: quality education, employment, health services, housing and transport. These challenges are compounded by a fragile democratic system and reliance on external financing. Access to quality education, higher education and employment becomes a gateway for young Mozambicans to European countries, with Portugal being a natural choice because of historical ties and linguistic affinity.

Meanwhile, the current scenario is marked by a growing denial of the past promoted by new Western nationalisms—manifested above all in the rise of far-right movements. These discourses minimize the effects of colonialism and a whole series of committed atrocities²³, even as these facts persist in society and collective memory.

But, as Felwine Sarr suggests, in order to turn the page, we need this deconstruction, this reparation, so that we can reach another stage in the relationship. Meanwhile, Mozambique is in the process of healing from colonial physical, moral and mental violence. In this regard, we can highlight three actions in the field of education, the Portuguese language and academic reflection initiatives.

The implementation of bilingual education on an experimental basis from 1993-1997 in the provinces of Gaza and Tete, expanded to more areas of the country, represents a change in the national approach that limited school progression to children from rural areas who could not speak Portuguese. According to the Bilingual Education Expansion Strategy (2020–2029), this policy constitutes a cornerstone in building a nation rooted in unity through diversity, as it recognizes and promotes multilingualism and multiculturalism in Mozambique.

.Another noteworthy development is the production of the Dictionary of Mozambican Portuguese (DiPoMo) by the Chair of Portuguese as a Second and Foreign Language at the Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM). The Dictionary of Mozambican²⁴ Portuguese follows the construction and publication, in 2014, of the Mozambican Orthographic Vocabulary of the Portuguese Language, a resource that made it possible to describe Mozambican Portuguese (MP) alongside other varieties, from a non-contrastive perspective, and thus develop a first large-scale linguistic resource.

Looking at these recent events and in the wake of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the independence celebrations in Mozambique—including the commemorations of the Wiriyamu Massacre (1972), the April Revolution (1974), and Mozambique's Independence (1975)—and taking into account the anticipated governmental transformation following the 2024 elections, it is timely to enter in a new phase. As Felwine Sarr writes: “It is a matter of closing off the space left open for an external perspective, which, while not always negative, most often borrows from history its own way of looking at things, of seeing how this historical path was constructed and articulated."²⁵

Nota bene: This article has been originally written in Portuguese.

Bibliographie

Cardoso, Rafael, Historical debt: how can Portugal repair colonial crimes?, on 29 December 2024 at https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/direitos-humanos/noticia/2024-04/divida-historica-como-portugal-pode-reparar-escravidao

Meneses, Maria Paula, “Colonialismo como violência: a “missão civilizadora” de Portugal em Moçambique”, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, Special issue, 2018, pp. 115-140.

Ribeiro, Fernando Bessa, “A invenção dos heróis: nação, história e discursos e identidade em Moçambique”, Etnográfica, vol. 9, 2005, pp. 257-275.

Diop, Babacar Mbaye, The Question of The Restitution of The African Heritage Preserved in The Museums of The Western World, International Journal of Arts, Humanities & Social Science, vol. 1, n. 1, November, 2020, pp. 76-83.

Mbembe, Achille, Out of the dark night: essays on decolonisation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2021.

Sarr, Felwine, Afrotopia, Antigona, 2016, Trad. Marta Lança.

Acordos de Maputo. Memorando de Entendimento sobre Assuntos Militares, Maputo/Gorongosa, August 2018. Available at: https://maputoaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/MOU.pdf